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The Heideggerian question posed here as “what does it mean to dwell in a 
global age” leaves open, invites even, the possibility of committing two 
conceptual mistakes from which, depending on the theoretical universe we 
inhabit, two separate sets of problems arise.  
 On the one hand, if the adverbial “in a global age” is taken to denote a 
radical historical caesura between “our age” and the age in which the 
concept was first deployed, one has to prove that the caesura is indeed not 
only historically operative but legitimate on an ontological level. This 
would, however, be a futile attempt: there hardly exists an essential, 
qualitative difference between the ontological regime of “our global age” 
and the one sketched in Heidegger's 1954 essay “Building Dwelling 
Thinking.” We have not been blessed by any epochal turns, despite 
important switches – to move for a second to a different register—in regimes 
of accumulation. Thus, it may be concluded, the ontological question about 
the state of “dwelling in a precarious age” has already been posed and 
answered by Heidegger himself—from an ontological perspective, he is our 
contemporary.1 And of course, to such question there can in fact be only one 
answer: it is the same “metaphysics” that has precluded the possibility of 
“dwelling” (initiated a “denial of dwelling” as it is put here) throughout 
modernity that gave rise to our age as global. But then to avoid the mistake 
sketched out above and the repetition of an already accomplished analysis, 
the question as it is posed for us here (“what does it mean to dwell in a 
global age”) should be taken as a politicization of the original concept, 
foreign to a puritanically ontological Heideggerian diagnostics, although 
building on its foundations: what is to be done historically at this moment to 
enter “dwelling”? 
 On the other hand, and from a materialistically-minded perspective 
outside of the Heideggerian conceptual universe, if the above problem of 
correctly posing the question of dwelling is disregarded and the adverbial 
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“in a global age” taken to be less of a conceptual modification, and more of a 
tactical intervention, an invitation to reactivate a certain modernist criticism 
of modernity by relocating it to a different, postmodern, historical context, 
we commit the error of actually dehistoricizing the concept. The addition of 
historical coordinates (“global age”) to Heidegger's ontological concept 
allows us to stretch it beyond the original horizon of its deployment while 
assuming that this is indeed possible, and without asking if it is desirable. 
Thus we escape the problematization of its own, necessarily historical 
charge and function for Heidegger's own location in history. This amounts 
to a silent vindication of a broad philosophical criticism of modernity that 
reverberates with deictics such as “we” and “age,” and admits a set of 
concepts and theoretical orientation points tied to what was once identified 
by Theodor Adorno as “the jargon of authenticity” into what should be, it 
was concluded above, a politicization. If we agree that in the sphere of 
theory this means forging concepts that can be historically operative beyond 
the academic field, then such a deictic strategy is not the most efficient one 
and as such amounts to no more than a cry in the academic wilderness, a 
painful enjoyment in the pathos of speculation.  
 Thus the only available option for a firmly re-historicizing method of 
addressing the problem of dwelling (if we admit it is a real problem) is as 
always, to do just that: to attempt a conceptually convincing historization of 
this problem (and concept) at the point of its emergence in order to reveal 
how it bends discourse about perceived socio-historical reality into a specific 
ideological arrangement. If it is operative at another point in history, to 
situate it within a transformed historical context and see how it does the 
same at a different location. From this, such arrangements can be rejected, or 
retained, or—hopefully—an alternative arrangement can take shape.  
 The concept of dwelling, central for Heidegger's later philosophy and 
serving as a key critical tool for a diagnostic of modernity's plight, 
functions—perhaps we can say notoriously—on several coexisting levels. It 
is simultaneously an ontological category and a socio-historical prescription; 
a transhistorical essential, and a seemingly radical sublation of a “really 
existing” historical logic. In his exegesis of Heidegger's later philosophy, 
Julian Young confirms this by elaborating how the concept functions in two 
capacities – the “essential” and the “existential” one:  
Dwelling is our essence, 'essential' dwelling, as we may call it, 
something we all possess. In modernity, however, we fail to 
understand our essential dwelling, fail to 'experience and take [it] 
over'. Encaged by metaphysics we fail to experience either our 
ultimate security or our mission of guardianship. That is why, 
though 'essentially' dwelling, modem humanity in another sense - let 
us call it the 'existential' sense - fails to dwell.2 
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 In other words, the concept not only enfolds a historical dimension 
but also projects an undeniably political one. Putting aside the usual 
proposition that Heidegger's thought is “non-political,”3 I would like to 
reconstruct here the basic contours of a political “suggestivity” emerging 
from the method of his later philosophy. Its formula is the following: 
dwelling as “man's” essence is inescapable, it is man's destiny. But man 
somehow falls short of it, does not “bring dwelling to the fullness of its 
nature”. This occurs by not perceiving “the real plight of dwelling as the 
plight,” and by not “[giving] thought to [man's] homelessness.”4 Hence 
modern man does not only fail, but fails tragically, insofar as “he” fails to 
retrieve what already belongs to him. A certain politics of dwelling 
unavoidably emerges out of this: firstly, from the diagnosis of failure, 
suggesting on the one hand negatively that man is “doing it wrong”, but 
implying on the other positively that there is a correct way of doing it. 
Secondly, from the gesture of retrieval (“pick up what's yours”) that is 
suggested as the minimal praxis of this politics. Heidegger's carefully crafted 
vocabulary famously indicates an essentially conservationist purpose for the 
gesture of retrieval: “staying with,” “preserving,” “safeguarding,” “bringing 
into fullness,” “leaving in its own nature”:  
Real sparing is something positive and takes place when we leave 
something beforehand in its own nature, when we return it 
specifically to its being, when we 'free' it in the real sense of the 
word into a preserve of peace. To dwell, to be set at peace, means to 
remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that 
safeguards each thing in its nature. The fundamental character of 
dwelling is this sparing and preserving.5 
The content of the retrieval is ontological. A successful retrieval is a 
revelation of being, and, speaking from the “ontic,” politicized, perspective 
of man who failed, its restoration. Which brings us to Fred Dallmayr's 
important point that being “for Heidegger was essentially a synonym for 
freedom.”6 So the politics of dwelling is a prophetic politics, insofar as it 
depends on a recognition of truth and fulfillment of its liberatory possibility 
as already anticipated, foretold in being. And it is a politics of restoration 
insofar as this truth was once (prior to metaphysics) unconcealed. And it is a 
politics of epiphany insofar as the recognition of truth and the fulfillment of 
its possibility remain one.  
As a useful heuristic and in an attempt to situate this project as a 
historical one, it is interesting to compare this to the contemporaneous 
philosophy of Ernst Bloch that, despite fundamental differences, 
encompasses important related themes. A similar notion of freedom by 
retrieval can be discerned in the famous conclusion to Bloch's The Principle 
of Hope: “Once he has grasped himself and established what is his, without 
expropriation and alienation, in real democracy, there arises in the world 
something which shines into the childhood of all and in which no one has 
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yet been: homeland.”7 Despite the explicitly programmatic thrust of concepts 
such as “real democracy” and “expropriation,” suggesting Bloch's more 
“sociological” preoccupations, both philosophies tie the concept of freedom 
closely to the problem of habitation: “dwelling” and “homeland,” reflecting 
concerns of belonging and recognition, stand opposed to the homelessness 
and alienation of the modern man. Both perceive the epochal split between 
“man” and “being,” and propose a re-creation of a holistic historical domain 
in which this split would be sutured. Both propositions are also based on 
openly paradoxical conceptions: homeland is recognized, although no one 
has seen it; dwelling is simultaneously to be “set at peace” [zum Frieden 
gebracht sein] and “to remain at peace” [eingefriedet bleiben in das Frye]. 
The relief of the perceived tension between man and being is imagined in 
the form of paradox that seems to neutralize this tension (the “ailments” of 
metaphysics/alienation). In a typically modernist fashion, the paradoxes 
mark the spot where a utopian launch into the poetic is to occur. 
 But again, despite these similarities, Bloch's political conception is a 
pragmatic and an activist one, admitting in an “ontic” logic of political cause 
and effect. There are obstacles to homeland's emergence (exploitation, 
democratic deficit...)—remove them—and man feels at home in the world, 
autonomously realizing the potential that has been given to him. It is a 
subjectivist and a humanist account, unacceptable from a Heideggerian 
perspective. The Principle of Hope itself is what might be called a 
monumental anthropological compendium, an account of human practices 
and cultural activity motivated by the “Utopian impulse,” immanent to 
historical development and serving to pass on the promise of freedom until, 
as Bloch famously wrote, true Genesis is found not at the beginning but at 
the end. Anson Rabinbach elaborates that “history for Bloch is predicated on 
a future-oriented knowledge that transcends the empirical order of things, 
that does not take flight in false images or fall prey to naturalism, but is 
directed beyond the existing world toward a yet unrealized “messianic 
goal.”8 Bloch's “man” is forward-oriented and steered towards the future 
Genesis by “knowledge” ingrained in a series of Utopian, prefigurative 
manifestations. 
 Against this futuristic gnosis and humanist background, later 
Heidegger's ontology appears rather static. As opposed to Bloch, the 
“promise of freedom” or the realization of the possibility of (existential) 
dwelling is not dependent on a causal interaction with the political. Social 
relations and institutional barriers are not what one should be concentrating 
on: “the real plight of dwelling does not lie in a lack of houses.”9 The real 
plight of dwelling is “older” and consists of the need for “mortals” to “ever 
learn to dwell.” The “homelessness,” Heidegger's diagnosis of the ailments 
afflicting the man of modernity, is an effect of man's failure to think about 
this real plight, of a lack of knowledge necessary for the alleviation of 
homelessness' “misery.” Once in possession of this knowledge, “it is a 
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misery no longer.”10 Thus Heidegger's “cure” turns out to be a thoroughly 
cognitive one, dependent on the consistency of ontological thought-effort (as 
opposed to that, even though Bloch's has a fundamental cognitive 
component to it—the “future-oriented knowledge”—it has to be 
supplemented by pragmatic Utopian prefigurations). 
 Thus conceived, thoroughly severed from subjectivist interventionism, 
dwelling—whose “fundamental character is sparing and preserving”—is 
simply “to remain at peace.”11 It is not entered into in its fullness by way of 
meddling with the ontic but by way of an onto-contemplative relation to 
being as revealed in things, through a conservationist effort whose ultimate 
aim is the “safeguarding [of] each thing in its nature.” Dwelling is always “a 
staying with things.”12  
 But dwelling, as we already mentioned, has an additional dimension: 
It is simultaneously “to remain at peace” but also to be “set at peace” within 
“the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature.” It is to be freed by 
remaining undisturbed. The category functions simultaneously as a 
condition of possibility of the escape from modernity's plight and its 
successful conclusion, the starting point and the final destination. If we draw 
this circularity at the heart of later Heidegger's criticism of modernity out 
onto the surface of history, we might try to determine if it has a socio-
political equivalent. But first let us further elaborate its logic by describing 
this project as providing a conceptual framework meant to envision a 
practice of movement while remaining at the same place, or remaining at the 
same place while moving. Heidegger himself provides a practical example 
of this with his bridge in Heidelberg:  
From this spot right here, we are there at the bridge – we are by no 
means at some representational content in our consciousness. From 
right here we may even be much nearer to that bridge and to what 
it makes room for than someone who uses it daily as an indifferent 
river crossing…. I am never here only, as this encapsulated body; 
rather, I am there, that is, I already pervade the room, and only 
thus can I go through it.13 
What connects two states, locations, things usually registered as separate, 
what equates them is belonging to the same, immanently positive order 
(“real sparing is something positive”14). 
Insofar as it is necessary to engage in thought (“thinking for the sake 
of dwelling”) in order to facilitate the revelation of that order, and insofar as 
the revelation (and its safeguarding) offers an opportunity for safety beyond 
the failures of metaphysics and modernity, it is necessary to conceptualize 
that order as possessing a positive transformative latency which is activated 
upon its disclosure. The historical content of what appears as this latency is 
irrelevant, what is important is following the necessary, ontologically 
legitimate procedures for its unconcealment and preservation in dwelling 
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(from this perspective, Heidegger surprisingly appears as almost a 
formalist15).  
 And if to dwell is to “inhabit 'the poetic',”16 we should also assume that 
“mortals” recognize the true revelation of being as the poetic effect, as a 
mystical (not in the liberal meaning of “irrational”) experience of being in its 
immediacy. Thus also the criteria for activity legitimate for true dwellers are 
shifted from the terrain of “will” (science, politics, etc.) to the terrain of 
affect.  
 This is perhaps the moment where a space opens up for the 
introduction of a more pragmatic criticism hinted at above. If we theorize 
the “really existing” modernist reactionary political movements, i.e. fascism, 
as preservationist, as a grand historical flurry of activity aimed at preserving 
the stability of the (capitalist) order behind it (this is an extension of Walter 
Benjamin's dictum that behind every fascism there is a failed revolution), 
and if we add that for this they required a poetization of the political, a 
politics of affective intoxication, we can easily establish that there is a strong 
analogy between the logic of the conservationist political “suggestivity” of 
dwelling and the conservatism of really existing reactionary modernist 
political movements.  
 From this reconstruction of the minimal politics of dwelling, 
understood among other things as a critique of modernity, I would like to 
move on to an examination of whether and in what forms do such 
conceptions survive culturally in the “global age.” I would like to propose 
that there is a prominent contemporary cultural form in which the sorts of 
concerns characteristic for a broader modernist critique of modernity are 
rearticulated and redeployed ideologically to form a characteristic cultural 
imaginary of the “West” as it exists in the epoch of capitalist universality. 
 It seems that today the narrative genre whose central concern is the 
questioning of the existential possibilities of dwelling is precisely the one 
that enacts scenarios of its ultimate obstruction. By this I mean, of course, the 
tediously omnipresent narratives of the apocalypse. In its various 
incarnations, the apocalyptic genre has been famously prominent during the 
Cold War period, so much so that the “increasing familiarity and plausibility 
of the idea of an imminent apocalypse has promoted the production of 
surreal apocalyptic visions both inside and outside the genre.”18 During the 
past quarter century this prominence has been maintained, if perhaps in 
guises different from the nuclear holocaust, the apocalyptic dominant of the 
Cold War. Instead we find natural disasters, alien invasions, global failures 
of technology, and most importantly: zombies. The horizon of historical 
possibility at the “End of History” seems to be a narrowly eschatological 
one. This, however, might be a misleading claim to make. As Frank 
Kermode's famous study examining apocalyptic imagination across 
centuries demonstrates, “there is nothing distinguishing about 
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eschatological anxiety.”19 In other words, a panoramic historical overview 
reveals a persistent apocalyptic tradition seemingly justifying the conclusion 
that apocalyptic narrative is as transhistorical a phenomenon as only a 
broadly conceived literary “mode,” such as the comic or the tragic, could be. 
But though it might be true that, with a loose enough definition and 
periodization, there is no “epoch” this side of Utopia without processing of 
“eschatological anxiety” through one cultural form or another, this approach 
simply confirms the presence of the “mode,” but fails to account for its 
motivation, prominence, and function, telling us nothing distinguishing of 
the discursive frames and genericity of an epoch, and thus nothing of the 
epoch itself.20 Hence an adjusted, more sensitive approach would attempt to 
reveal that there is, indeed, something distinguishing about contemporary 
eschatological anxiety. In fact, it could be claimed that it is precisely the 
contemporary inflection of the “mode” that should be regarded as one of the 
central spaces for the imaginary enactment of the “epochal” questions of the 
“End of History,” or capitalist universality, however we might choose to 
periodize it. Ontological inquiry being immanent to the narrative logic of the 
form, apocalyptic narrative is uniquely suited to this in an age that smugly 
treats its present as the fulfillment of its eschatology. 
 One should account for such treatment on an ideological level. Our 
secularized apocalypse has been transformed from a faraway promise of 
teleological conclusion, a dream of rapture, to a simple cautionary tale, a 
moralist warning of modernity's hubris. But since in every moralist there is 
also a pervert, so is the cultural enjoyment of apocalyptic narratives not 
simply a sensible, didactic consideration of danger, but also an onanistic 
pleasure: “We can actually destroy the world. How powerful we are.”  
 But to ensure that “we” remain as powerful, a more perfidious 
warning is added. The consequence of what Jameson called the “waning of 
historicity” has been that the violent, modernist intuition of historical 
possibility is dulled into a skepticism that acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
failing to imagine historical rupture as anything but necessarily catastrophic 
is surely helpful in ensuring that such ruptures will be avoided. Under such 
conditions, where a focus on the constructive dimension of historical 
rupture is replaced by an obsession with the destructive one, the intuition of 
historical possibility is repressed but constantly returns as the apocalypse. 
From this vantage point the contemporary apocalypse is revealed as a 
degenerate Utopia. To put it differently, under the conditions of capitalist 
universality the absence of Utopia as a regulative ideal registers as the 
apocalypse. 
 More positively, and following from this: as a prominent cultural 
form, apocalyptic narrative cannot be sustained simply by a negative 
ideological function, it cannot functionally exist as a blunt negation of 
Utopia but also has to offer a Utopian charge of its own. This dialectic of 
apocalypse and Utopia, presumably universal, has been noted in passing by 
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Jacques Derrida in a lecture entitled “Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently 
Adopted in Philosophy” where he writes: “we know that every apocalyptic 
eschatology is promised in the name of light, of seeing and vision, and a 
light of light, of a light brighter than all the lights it makes possible.”21 What 
is this light in the case of our secular apocalypse? 
 The age of universalized capitalism—with its attendant phenomena of 
expansion of financialization, globalization of production, etc., that go in 
step with technological changes of the “information age”—is in “post-
ideological” Western techno-plutocracies characterized by a general and 
often aestheticized22 sense of overcomplexity, as well as a very real 
experience of political impotence and disenfranchisement.23 The historical 
development of capitalism led to a need for new institutional frameworks 
for accumulation and consequent establishment of suprastate institutions 
and global circulation of commodities, or in other words, to a relative 
homogenization of the institutional field in which various capitals compete 
in a common arena on a global level. But the old proletariat has meanwhile 
been forced to endure not simply a breakdown of its social welfare 
institutions, but with them more broadly a breakdown of a specific form of 
institutions of sociality. This has had consequences on the level of culture, 
one of them being the lack of what Jameson calls the “cultural dominant,” 
leading in turn to the “view of present history as sheer heterogeneity, 
random difference, a coexistence of a host of distinct forces whose effectivity 
is undecidable.”24 Jameson's own method of totalization has been a possible 
theoretical answer to this. But I would propose here that an analogous 
answer to the disorienting ideological effect of the combination of 
overcomplexity and exposure to “random difference” has also developed in 
a narrative form—as the apocalyptic narrative of capitalist universality. A 
more dramatic and effective totalization—an illuminating logic that 
everything can be related to—than the end of the world can hardly be 
imagined. And even though it is a spurious logic, it is borne out of a cultural 
necessity to think, let us allow a philosophical indulgence, the wholeness of 
the world.    
 This is also the right place to consider this by going back to the 
Heideggerian problematic of dwelling discussed above. The complex of 
practices and procedures that guide dwelling—building as letting-dwell, 
setting at peace, safeguarding, etc.—all serve to facilitate the disclosure of 
being. In Heidegger's poetically charged vocabulary, such dwelling “occurs 
as the fourfold preservation of the fourfold”, or in other words, it is a 
revelation and reaffirmation of the world as a compound.25 This is also where 
the poetic effect of dwelling comes from, dwelling “lights up” the 
compound of the dweller's world.26 If we conceive of apocalyptic narrative as 
a preconceptual totalizing gesture, a narrative conjuring of a universal 
framework of reference, and in addition remember the etymology of the 
term apocalypse as revelation or disclosure, we can relate this to the “poetic 
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lighting up” of dwelling: the illuminating effects of our apocalypse, like 
ontological world-disclosure, also strive to reaffirm, in its compound nature, 
the whole of being. So a formula of a quite specific historical-cultural-
political imaginary arises: to inhabit the poetic, we must first pass through 
the apocalypse.  
 But access to totality is in this narrative genre very often reimagined 
not simply at the price of an abstract total collapse, but at the price of a 
wholesale abandonment of modernity. Insofar as this is true, the 
contemporary apocalypse is a dominantly Heideggerian genre, or at least a 
genre echoing a set of critical habits for which a 20th century anti-modern 
hostility is central. Roughly, I think these habits can be classified as firstly, 
recollective metod (a conception of finding a way out through a “return to,” 
an analeptic leap), secondly reconcretization (an affirmation of practice, 
objects, and use value as opposed to thought, abstraction, and exchange 
value), and thirdly overcoming subjectivity (an escape from not only the 
“Cartesian hubris,” but from what Renata Salecl calls “tyranny of choice,” 
desire exploited by capital, and ultimately demands of liberal citizenship).  
 As these themes have historically emerged in the traditions of 
modernist criticism of and disenchantment with modernity only to be 
reactivated and redeployed within contemporary narrative genres sharing 
similar concerns, one might call them undead, zombie criticisms. And what 
better setting for their redeployment than the pinnacle of contemporary 
apocalyptic imaginary, the zombie apocalypse? 
 If Deleuze and Guattari were correct in identifying the zombie as “the 
only modern myth,”27 it is unsurprising that its many recent interpreters 
have applied the modern myth-busting procedure of historical materialist 
allegoresis to address it (including Deleuze and Guattari, who claim 
elsewhere that “zombie is a work myth, not a war myth,”28 i.e. its socio-
historical referent is labor). In fact, there has been an entire strain of recent 
historical materialist analysis more or less consciously updating Marx's 
original Gothic imaginary for the age of the zombie.29 And certainly, the 
zombie immediately strikes one as an aptly functional figure to introduce a 
touch of necessary horror to the age of bailed out banks, infused with 
capital—dead labor—only to come back to life as the institutional undead of 
capitalism, plodding through a ravaged scenery of the post-crisis world. Or, 
depending on the context, level of abstraction, and element in the process of 
accumulation we want to concentrate on, to the age of immigrant labor and 
massive unemployment on the periphery.30 But perhaps it is theoretically 
best justified, as Steve Shaviro has argued, to observe the zombie, as 
opposed to Marx's vampire, as a more appropriate figure for capital itself in 
the age of capitalist universality.31 
 In any case, this work of allegoresis has been productive and useful, 
and it sets the coordinates within which “totalizing” readings of the zombie 
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apocalypse as a genre should operate. But it seems that its most important 
contemporary developments steer us away from the focus on the figure of 
the zombie and the allegoresis that it invites to a different type of 
symptomatic reading. The allegorical structure of the zombie apocalypse, far 
from simply being reproduced through different plot variations, has recently 
been subsumed into an innovative effort to extend and repurpose the genre. 
To be able to go into that in more detail, we need to focus on the peculiar 
habits and rituals of the genre's reception, as well as the fact it acquired an 
amount of popularity and even a certain cultural prestige that only forms 
central to the “popular imagination” achieve. Of course, under capitalism, 
this also means that an entire cultural sub-industry is predicated on these 
habits and rituals, i.e. what might provisionally be called the will to 
apocalypse.  
 The genre had the rare honor to be codified as the ultimate 
postmodern fantasy by institutions of the US state. This occurred with a 
metafictional move by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 
2011, which attempted to demonstrate popular cultural literacy and harness 
it for the purposes of a public safety campaign by cleverly using the zombie 
trope. The CDC first published a blog article entitled Preparedness 101: 
Zombie Apocalypse detailing the best way to prepare for the event. This 
generated an unprecedented amount of public interest, crashing their 
website, and soon after, an official, publicly funded zombie comic entitled 
Zombie Pandemic appeared, with further useful instructions. 
 On the opposite side of the key duality of our age, the market, we find 
the same enthusiasm. It is perhaps enough to look at the first page of 
Amazon search results for the term “zombie” in order to confirm how 
appropriate a concept “the will to apocalypse” is for the rituals of this 
genre's reception. These days one can find there several survival guides in 
book form to help prepare for the apocalypse (most notably Max Brooks' 
Zombie Survival Guide: Complete Protection from the Living Dead and 
Lauren Wilson and Kristian Bauthus's The Art of Eating through the Zombie 
Apocalypse: A Cookbook and Culinary Survival Guide), along with zombie-
head plush slippers (you put your feet in the zombie's mouth), and perhaps 
most explicitly, a t-shirt with the inscription “The hardest part about a 
zombie apocalypse will be to act like I'm not excited.”  
 What this zombie folklore suggests is not simply that the zombie 
apocalypse seems to be the preferred apocalyptic scenario of the post-Cold 
War era, but that instead of approaching it as a cautionary tale, one should 
approach it as a collective fantasy. Rituals of the genre's reception 
encompass enthusiasm and identification, despite the gruesome 
consequences of that particular fantasy's realization (of course, it would be 
reasonable to suggest that this might precisely be the point, but more on that 
shortly). The logical question to ask is why is it imagined as desirable? There 
must be a light promised even in the name of the zombie apocalypse. After 
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all, narratives of the nuclear holocaust, ecological or cosmic disasters have 
not awoken the same type of excited expectation as the hordes of the undead 
feasting on the flesh of the living. This might be a simple question of “too 
close for comfort”—the Verfremdungseffekt of a fantastical scenario makes 
it easier to enact fantasies of social destruction and regeneration without the 
burden of facing the realistic possibility of it actually happening. However, 
neither have the similarly unlikely War of the Worlds scenarios of alien 
invasions and subsequent wars with the invaders ever been desired with 
quite the same millenarian zeal. The reason for this might be quite a 
practical, or more precisely, a narratological one. The other mentioned 
scenarios are simply not so well-adapted for the purpose of probing what it 
means to inhabit a world beyond the compulsions of capitalist modernity, 
what it means to dwell in the “beyond.” A few examples: in their most 
conspicuous, Hollywood forms wars against aliens usually “unite 
humanity” and provide an opportunity for a reinvigorated, heroic beginning 
from exactly where we left off. Aliens are here just an outsourced enemy, 
and the conflict reverses the effects of overproduction and activates a new 
cycle of accumulation. Nuclear holocausts are proper ends of the world as 
they not only destroy everything but exlude the possibility of reconstruction 
for as long as it takes for radioctive particles to decay. And natural disasters 
are one-time, “short sharp shock” events whose randomness and enormity is 
such that they become socially meaningless. So back to the zombie fantasy. 
Properly entertaining it, or in more technical terms, becoming the implied 
reader of the genre, one fantasizes about weapons and vehicles one would 
use during the zombie outbreak, about practical ways of securing food, 
about shelter, supplies, protection of loved ones, and best ways to eliminate 
threats. One develops a system of one's own (every character in the 
apocalyptic narrative has their own survivalist identity) and imagines it is 
the best and the most efficient one. In other words, one imagines survival 
while everybody else dies. It is from this perspective, at least partially, a 
narcissistic dream of a Darwinist social purge.  
 But simultaneously, and more relevantly, such a framework 
“[permits] an extended thought experiment about the reconstitution of 
community life under conditions of severe privation and perpetual 
danger.”32 It would be too facile to use this to draw an analogy between 
“severe privation and perpetual danger” of the zombie apocalypse and the 
one of the precarious capitalist everyday. But indeed, in a social 
arrangement in which, as Margaret Thatcher famously pronounced, “there is 
no such thing as society,” complete devastation seems to be a logical 
prerequisite for a renewed thinking about social life. What this seems to 
mean at this point in history, however, at least in the core of the world-
system, is that the will to zombie apocalypse, the cultural demand for an 
“extended thought experiment” materializes in the zombie anti-modernism 
reminiscent of the critique of modernity we analyzed at the beginning. To 
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elaborate this, we can finally turn to the most interesting and successful 
recent example of the genre. 
 In the oft-quoted words of Robert Kirkman, the writer and, together 
with artist Tony Moore, creator of The Walking Dead, a popular comic that 
formed the basis of a record-breaking, award-winning AMC's TV series, the 
comic grew out of the need for precisely the extended experiment 
mentioned above, as Kirkman wanted to create “a zombie movie that never 
ends.” The Walking Dead first appeared in 2003 and has had a publication 
history that very few comics accomplish. After 144 issues and 12 years, in 
2015 it is still going strong. In his introduction-cum-mission statement in the 
comic’s first issue, Kirkman writes that “good zombie movies show us how 
messed up we are, they make us question our station in society...and our 
society's station in the world…. With 'The Walking Dead' I want to explore 
how people deal with extreme situations and how these events CHANGE 
them. I'm in this for the long haul…. I hope you guys are looking forward to 
a sprawling epic.”33  
 And indeed, it has been sprawling, and there has been plenty of 
change. Besides witnessing total social collapse as an unknown contagion 
turns people into flesh-eating zombies, the characters are exposed to an 
unrelenting barrage of traumatic experiences: from watching loved ones 
getting ripped apart by zombie attacks, fighting to death against competing 
groups of survivors over scarce resources, to various isolated instances of 
rape, murder, and mutilation in a narrative that now spans years. All of this 
under the constant shadow of what for the most part of the series published 
so far seemed as one of the rare certainties in the world of The Walking 
Dead—the impossibility to establish long-term safety and a stable post-
apocalyptic community.  
 But interestingly, it is not zombies, who after the initial shock 
eventually become simply another blind force of nature, an environmental 
condition one confronts in a similar manner as one confronts the weather, 
who are the main source of instability and horror. It is other humans. As the 
central character, former police officer Rick Grimes, realizes slightly more 
than half way into the published narrative: “I can't believe it took me this 
long to realize this. After so long, being driven from one place to the next... I 
noticed, it was always people – that was the problem. I can't believe I'm 
saying this but the dead...They're a manageable threat.”34 
 One should also transfer this observation to the level of narrative 
form: it is not the zombies, a relatively exhausted allegorical trope of which 
George Romero remains the master, that maintain the dramatic tension of 
the narrative. Allegory is not a structural dominant here. (Even though 
Kirkman's take on it introduced an important innovation: all humans carry 
the contagion even if they are not bitten, effectively equating them with 
zombies.) Zombies provide a convenient genre code and a framework of 
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narrative limitations and possibilities, a logic that makes the development of 
a coherent scenario possible. But The Walking Dead extends the 
Romeroesque “allegory of contemporary society” to the point of breaking its 
boundaries. The epic sprawl of the narrative provides sufficient terrain for 
staging series of narrative psychosocial “experiments,” following through 
with the logic of the apocalyptic world far beyond what a standard non-
serial narrative format would allow. In The Walking Dead, these 
experiments focus on the characters (who are regularly subjected to 
harrowing experiences and routinely killed-off) and their interactions in an 
almost sadistic determination to test and display presumed psychological 
breaking points and speculate about dynamics of social conflict. But despite 
such a focus, The Walking Dead is not an ethical treatise and steers clear of 
most temptations of sentimental moralism (the TV series, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, emphasizes this dimension much more). Despite the often-
heard cliché, the narrative is not “about making hard choices” for the simple 
reason that the choices it dramatizes are not hard. Certainly, they are 
traumatic, dangerous, and often gruesome, but rarely are they complex or 
paradoxical, and in most cases their consequences are easily predictable and 
unfold immediately. In a way, this is directly opposed to the sort of choices 
we are generally used to making in our pre-apocalyptic innocence (or, 
depending on your position, corruption). The spectrum of options available 
for a single choice in The Walking Dead is extremely narrow and the 
longest-surviving central characters quickly learn to make them in a brutally 
simple and straightforwardly utilitarian manner in order to protect family, 
avoid strangers, kill threats. The ethical universe of this apocalyptic 
narrative, despite its drama, is not only rather spare, but, formally speaking, 
pastoral. And the trauma resulting from the necessity of regularly having to 
make such choices might be serious, but it is eventually neutralized as the 
characters regularly “grow” and “change” in such a way as to internalize the 
horrific necessities their world mandates. The others are simply “weak.” The 
constant discussions of guilt, conscience, and necessity between characters 
soon become a formalized ritual whose function is to cement what 
everybody already knows: “It had to be done.” And since everybody 
already knows it has to be done, it is not really a choice. Insofar as the 
subject of capitalist universality is trapped by Salecl's tyranny of choice, The 
Walking Dead allows its subjects to escape the tyranny—and indeed, choice 
as such—and in effect overcome subjectivity. In a community of readers of 
apocalyptic narrative (as witnessed by the letters column in the comic), the 
horizon of expectation is such that identification with characters and 
fantasies of personal “survival systems” discussed above extend this effect 
until it becomes an intersubjective one. The implied reader also knows that it 
had to be done. 
 And to be sure, when things need to be done, we need doers who are 
ready to do them. As one of the comic's favorite characters, a katana-
wielding ex-lawyer Michonne, frames it while explaining she is certain her 
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children are dead because they were in the care of their father when the 
disaster struck: “I have no idea where they went, or if they're alive. But I 
know they're dead. I just know there's no way they made it. My husband, 
Dominic, he... He couldn't use a screwdriver. He was an artist.”35 The end of 
the world, obviously, is no place for artists. At least not bourgeois artists, the 
soft, daydreaming kind. Instead, it is a place for the resolute, the practical, 
the ruthless, the flower of the apocalypse. One of those is the central 
character Rick Grimes, who is slightly surprised as he grows into his role of 
a natural-born post-apocalyptic leader, or his son Carl (“as strong as his 
father”), who finds his place in one of the stable communities, years into the 
apocalypse by becoming a blacksmith's apprentice (“a valuable trade,” says 
Rick). As opposed to Michonne's dead husband, Carl loves “making useful 
things.”36 And Michonne herself, even though everybody she loved might be 
dead, finds solace in the glory of un-alienated labor: 
Everyone has a job and that job never stops. You work until you 
feel like your back is going to break and then you collapse and 
sleep like you've never slept before. And that's only if things are 
going well, which almost never happens... We had some shit go 
down out there. Life on the open water, it's hard. There's no time to 
think about what happened to you... or what you did. You just 
work... It's glorious.37 
 These and other equivalent motifs, carefully reveal the world after the 
end of the world not as a punishment, but as a redemption. The cult of hard 
work, use value as the only value-form, disappearance of abstraction (in his 
more artistic attempts, Carl sculpts figurines of people and animals to trade 
for other goods) and no general equivalent (the communities function on a 
strictly regulated system of barter, there is no money). Things return to 
being things, they are reconcretized. And mortals “stay with them,” 
rediscovering crafts “which still [use their] tools and frames as things.”38 The 
conditions for dwelling in its existential capacity are recreated at the price of 
an apocalypse that slowly takes on the shape of a utopia. 
 That something similar to this is in fact the intended point of such 
motifs is further emphasized by the text that appears on the back cover of 
The Walking Dead Compendium. The text reproduces a version of the 
standard popular critique of late capitalism as “consumerism” although 
radicalized by the introduction of the dialectical idea of salvation through 
collapse, and authentic living and labor. It is worth quoting in full:  
How many hours are in a day when you don't spend half of them 
watching television? When is the last time any of us REALLY 
worked to get something that we wanted? How long has it been 
since any of us really NEEDED something that we WANTED? 
The world we knew is gone. The world of commerce and 
frivolous necessity has been replaced by a world of survival and 
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responsibility. An epidemic of apocalyptic proportions has swept 
the globe causing the dead to rise and feed on the living. In a 
matter of months society has crumbled – no government, no 
grocery stores, no mail delivery, no cable TV. In a world ruled by 
the dead we are forced to finally start living.39 
 The same sentiment is further explored elsewhere in the narrative. 
After the initial period of chaos, nomadic survival, and war, a stable 
network of communities dependent on agriculture and crafts supplemented 
with foraging is established. For at least a couple of years, they last without 
major disturbances and the inhabitants develop a sense of belonging, safety, 
and stability. As Rick Grimes, who is by then not only the leader of one of 
the communities but the visionary founding father of the “confederation,” 
says to another leader, Maggie Greene, as they stand on a balcony 
overlooking the settlement they helped build and develop: “Truth is, things 
are almost better than before this all started.”40 
 And even some of the antagonists feel the same, even though theirs is 
a radically different idea of belonging. Alpha, the leader of a herd of 
survivors who regress back to what they see as humanity's true, animal-like 
nature issues a warning to Rick and Carl, whose way of life she sees as not 
radical enough, as vainly accepting the false, technological mode of being 
that will eventually lead back to the reconstruction of the fallen world: 
You've built a shrine to a long-dead world…. We are animals who 
always pretended we are not. You work and toil your days 
away...Working toward restoring a life where you exercise so you 
can sit in a chair and let a box lie to you until all your thoughts are 
gone. My people? Our lives are true. We live the full lives we were 
always meant to. You strive to return to a life as slaves to our petty 
desires...Instead of recognizing the gift this world has to offer. The 
gift of freedom.41  
In this contest in authenticity one could perhaps detect echoes of a perverted 
Heideggerian ontology. Alpha refuses “productivist metaphysics,” 
advocating a communal lifeworld bringing into fullness the essential 
capacities of “mortals”, recognizing/accepting the transformative latency 
(“the gift”) immanent to being, which, unsurprisingly, manifests as freedom. 
In comparison to Rick's future-oriented, technological community obsessed 
with safety, they do seem to have a point. However, they are imitators—not 
only of “animals” but of zombies. They wear masks and suits made of 
zombie skin to blend in undetected with the undead so that they can travel 
with and live among them for protection. They abandon the quest for a 
properly human ontological arrangement by imagining they have access to 
the one of animals. Unsurprisingly, they also refuse to build, they stay under 
the open skies and huddle together in the wild. They do not “stay with 
things.” In their inauthentic radicalism, zombie imitation is the only 
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guarantee of survival they have available. As it turns out, the cost of clinging 
to this precarious idealism is their cruelty and murderous territorialism.  
 As opposed to that, Rick's farming community builds. It practices 
crafts, barters, and develops organic communal rituals, strongly reminiscent 
of the US frontier myths. But with it, The Walking Dead introduces, at least 
for now, an interesting social innovation—anti-commercialism. Before we 
move on to further explain this, it might be helpful to frame this point by 
referring to Andrew Collier's criticism of Heidegger's analysis of technology 
and “productivist metaphysics.” Collier argues that the “truth underlying 
his critique of modernity” is unrecognized by Heidegger and can be 
extracted by reference to the Aristotelian-Marxist distinction between use 
value and exchange value, or in other words “that modernity, as capitalism, 
is dominated by exchange-value-driven production, not use-value-driven 
production.”42 In his critique of technology, Heidegger misses the crucial 
point by confusing the level of technological development with its goals. The 
great battle for ontological transformation is not fought between the 
windmill and the hydroelectric dam but, more essentially and conceptually 
justified, between use value and exchange value:  
The real ancestors of the stockpile attitude are neither the 
craftworker Socrates nor the aristocrat Plato, but the sophists. It is a 
commercialist meta-physics not a productivist one…. [It] is not the 
level of technology that is essential, but its goals…. Water mills, 
while characteristic of the feudal mode of production, did operate 
for some hundreds of years in market economies; and hydroelectric 
power stations, while first built in capitalist societies, could exist in 
a use-value-driven communist society…. A use-value-driven 
system of planning might still lead to the building of hydroelectric 
power stations. But the decision process would take into account 
the intrinsic value of the river system, setting it against the 
incommensurable value of increased electricity generation and 
deciding between them not on the basis of any countable units of 
value, but of an opinion about whether the world (or that part of it) 
would be a better place to live in with the untransformed river and 
less electricity, or with the transformed river and more electricity. 
Only those who lived in that part of the world would be in a 
position to make such a decision….43 
In Collier's decisionist account, which would most likely be dismissed as 
“subjectivist” by a Heideggerian counter-argument, there is no essence of 
the hydroelectric dam outside history. We can dwell, and still have a world 
that is lit up—electrically. At first glance, it seems that there is a trace of that 
realization and of the awareness of the essential difference between 
commodity production and use-value production in Rick Grimes' 
development plans. While waiting for everybody to arrive in order to do 
their usual barter, he is asked by another community leader, Ezekiel, to 
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adjust the agreed upon system of exchange and “lower the price,” thus 
introducing elements of a market system capable of adapting to what seems 
as changed dynamics of production. Rick is vehemently opposed and insists 
on maintaining the stability of a system of barter exchange and “centrally 
planned” prices they have developed:  
Ezekiel: Supply and demand being what it is... Your price on 
ammunition going down now?  
Rick: Supply and demand. If you know anyone else making bullets, 
feel free to shop around. I'm sure Dwight could start providing us 
with lumber.  
Ezekiel: Pull the claws back, Grimes, it was just a suggestion.  
Rick: Okay, okay. I guess I can't blame you for asking. It's just that 
we've a good system going. I don't want to screw that up.44 
Rick's community has an (ammunition) monopoly. But this is not the reason 
why he refuses Ezekiel's idea of lowering the price—even though a 
monopolist, he never attempts to raise prices either. Instead, he maintains a 
non-market system and insists on keeping the genie in the bottle. His 
reasons for this are interesting in the context of the above discussion: he is 
neither anti-technologist, nor anti-productivist. But he is anti-commercialist. 
He insists on maintaining the system they have for pragmatic reasons: 
because it works well as a system of maintaining stability, or more 
technically safety, in a radically dangerous world. For a narrative 
developing in the period where not only the memory but the direct 
consequences of the most recent financial crash are still active and visible, 
the market cannot but connote instability and danger.  
 Referenced constantly and explicitly, safety is the key and universal 
concern in Robert Kirkman's narrative. But far from simply being an 
overarching practical problem, “safety” becomes a type of fetish.45 “Keeping 
people safe” is the central character's mission, and variations of this phrase 
are repeated over and over again, often to justify decision making by group 
leaders. A proper polity in The Walking Dead is created only when the 
conditions for “institutionalizing” safety are met—good walls erected, 
guardsmen and patrolmen who clear the road organized and deployed. At 
one of the deciding moments in the narrative, the one where he realizes that 
“it was always people,” Rick is addressing his wounded and unconscious 
son and emphasizing his key concerns: “safety,” “security,” and “hope.” In 
the monologue he comes to the realization that a new type of stable 
community needs to be created. This takes a while, but after many obstacles, 
including war, are overcome, Rick gives a true founder's speech: “Whatever 
differences we had before, we must put those behind us as we move 
forward. The fighting is over... Now it is time for what comes next. We stand 
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here united, together as one people... and it is my wish for us to remain that 
way....”46 
 Such discourse is recognizable from any national mythology. In 
combination with other topoi of both the US frontier myth and the 
ideological compulsions of the US security state of the post-9/11 period that 
are reproduced in the narrative, it is not surprising that many critics read it 
in this key, and that the narrative appears as an influential postmodern 
update of the US nationalist and imperialist discourse.47 And this is 
undoubtedly a correct diagnosis, but instead on being satisfied with a focus 
on excavation of operative ideologemes of nationalism and imperialism, I 
think it is important to add that this is just one of the several ways in which 
the narrative is incapable of extending the political imaginary with reference 
to which it fashions its apocalyptic-Utopian experiment. This imaginary, as 
it has hopefully become clear from the analysis offered here, is built up by 
patching fantasies of a premodern (or non-modern) community of 
craftsmen-guardians together with a set of ideologemes picked up from 
imperialist nation-building discourse (a modern formation if there ever was 
one). But however dubious and contradictory this might be, what is 
important in the context of this analysis is that the patchwork is a result of a 
recollective method, instinctively turning to whatever past available for a 
criticism of modernity it perceives as undesirable. It is predicated on a 
“return to,” and imagines the safety it craves as lost and left behind. 
 This project, unsurprisingly, correlates with a political transformation 
of the community represented in the narrative into one that spontaneously 
installs a paternalistic political authority to shepherd it into safety. As Rick, 
with a benevolent smile of the master, tells one of the newcomers from the 
wild who finds herself surprised to be introduced by the rest of her group as 
the leader: “I was uncomfortable with the title for a long time so I know how 
you feel. There's no getting around it after a while. I've accepted the title and 
all that comes with it. I'm the leader here, yes.”48 In the next issue, exercising 
his rightful authority, he beats a patrolman securing the main road with a 
walking stick for failing to do the job: “If what we've all worked so hard and 
sacrificed so much to build is going to work... this road needs to be safe…. 
Your job is quite possibly the most important job these days. Remember 
that.”49  
 A recollection of a more authentic life where we “stay with things” 
and practice crafts which “still [use their] tools and frames as things,”50 
where we remain “before the divinities” and at peace within the free sphere 
that safeguards each thing in its nature”51 seems also to come at the price of 
what Bloch calls “real democracy” and gives rise to a form of political power 
whose problem is not simply that it is undemocratic but much worse, that it 
is heroic and paternalistic.  
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The key question is, of course, whether that problem is a failure of 
imagination—an ideological limitation of this particular narrative—or a 
structural necessity. What I have tried to demonstrate here is that the trinity 
of recollective method/overcoming subjectivity/reconcretization as a critical 
matrix our widely resonant cultural forms instinctively turn to for criticisms 
of (capitalist) modernity, entails a wholesale abandonment of modernity's 
premises. The ideological effect of this is quite problematic, as for this 
particular critical matrix, the return to the fold of “auratic authority” is, 
indeed, a structural consequence. Perhaps not in a direct causal way, but 
insofar as it begins with an imaginary return, pseudo-gnostically perceives 
and discards the structural compulsions of modern subjectivity as corrupt, 
and collapses the essential reality of historical order into ontology, its critical 
criteria (and implied positive projections) will both be unable of escaping the 
siren call of maintaining ontological consistency at the price of ontic 
apocalypse, as well as incapable of recognizing the redeeming aspects of 
modernity. In a wider context of the triumph of capitalist universality, this is 
also a symptom of a lack of a widely available alternative critical matrix. 
Alternative not simply in the sense of “some other,” but in the sense of a 
criticism of capitalist modernity from a more dialectical perspective of 
alternative modernity (the only historically existing form of which thus far 
was and is communism). If we try to envision such an alternative along the 
lines of the trinity, it would replace the recollective method with a 
speculative one, perhaps closer to Collier's decisionism than Blochian future-
oriented messianism, the insistence on overcoming subjectivity with a better 
theorization of the subject (Žižek's analysis of Heidegger's political choices 
referenced above provides a good start), and reconcretization will most 
likely be a secondary consequence of the necessary replacement of an 
exchange-value-driven modern order with an alternative one better suitable 
for “true dwelling.” In such an order, perhaps, instead of inviting the anti-
modern apocalypse to discover the poetic awaiting us there, we might 
decide to remain within history and work with the salvage of prose we find 
here, towards a future where the apocalypse might seem as out of place as 
Utopia is today.52 
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